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Abstract This article explores the notion of the
dislocated self following deep brain stimulation
(DBS) and concludes that when personal identity is
understood in dynamic, narrative, and relational
terms, the claim that DBS is a threat to personal
identity is deeply problematic. While DBS may result
in profound changes in behaviour, mood and cogni-
tion (characteristics closely linked to personality), it is
not helpful to characterize DBS as threatening to
personal identity insofar as this claim is either false,
misdirected or trivially true. The claim is false insofar
as it misunderstands the dynamic nature of identity
formation. The claim is misdirected at DBS insofar as
the real threat to personal identity is the discrimina-
tory attitudes of others towards persons with motor
and other disabilities. The claim is trivially true
insofar as any dramatic event or experience integrated
into one’s identity-constituting narrative could then
potentially be described as threatening. From the
perspective of relational personal identity, when DBS
dramatically disrupts the narrative flow, this disrup-
tion is best examined through the lens of agency. For
illustrative purposes, the focus is on DBS for the
treatment of Parkinson’s disease.
Keywords Neuroethics . Personal identity . Deep brain
stimulation . Parkinson’s disease . Agency
Ethics commentaries on the potential benefits and harms
of deep brain stimulation (DBS) to treat patients with
various advanced and treatment-refractory illnesses
such as Parkinson’s disease (PD), essential tremor,
major depression, and obsessive compulsive disorder,
often include a discussion of changes in personality and
potential threats to personal identity (See, for example,
[1–5]). In general, the authors of these commentaries
recognize that disabling physical and psychiatric
symptoms associated with illness can have a profound
impact on behaviour, mood and cognition. Unique
concerns are raised by some, however, when person-
ality changes attributed to DBS are perceived as
potential threats to personal identity.
For some commentators, concerns about DBS and
threats to personal identity only arise when the
personality changes are unwanted side-effects of
DBS (e.g., mania). Indeed, when changes in person-
ality resulting from DBS are positive (e.g., elevated
mood), the discussion more obviously focuses on the
promise of DBS. For others, concerns about threats to
identity arise even when the personality changes are
positive and consistent with therapeutic goals. In
these instances, there are concerns about the fact of
change, rather than the direction of change. Straddling
these different perspectives on the promise and threat
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feeling of strangeness and unfamiliarity with them-
selves after surgery (“I don’t feel like myself
anymore,” “I haven’t found myself again after the
operation”)” ([6], 1813).
This article explores the notion of the dislocated
self following DBS using a relational account of
personal identity [7]. For illustrative purposes, the
focus is on DBS for the treatment of PD—a chronic
progressive neuro-degenerative disorder. While DBS
is currently in use (or under investigation) for many
other disorders, this narrow focus is appropriate given
world experience with DBS for PD.
The article begins with a cursory look (using
patient narratives) at some of the benefits and harms
of DBS when used to control the motor symptoms of
PD. Next, a clear distinction is drawn between
personality and personal identity, after which the
basic features of a relational account of personal
identity are presented [7]. This philosophical discus-
sion introduces the concepts of projected and per-
ceived self-narratives and explains their role in the
cyclical and iterative process of identity formation
involving “self”-perception, “self”-projection, “other”-
perception, and “other”-reaction. In turn, this dis-
cussion is followed by a critical review of excerpts
from Helmut Dubiel’s autobiographical narrative
about life before and after PD, as well as life
before and after DBS for PD [8].
Applying a relational account of personal identity,
the article next reviews myriad plausible answers to the
question “Is DBS for PD a threat to personal identity?”
and concludes that while DBS may result in profound
changes in behaviour, mood and cognition (character-
istics closely linked to personality), there are problems
with the claim that DBS is a threat to personal identity.
This claim may be false, misdirected, or trivially true.
The claim is false insofar as it misunderstands the
dynamic nature of identity formation. The claim is
misdirected at DBS insofar as the real threat to personal
identity, when this is understood in relational terms, is
the discriminatory attitudes of others towards persons
with motor and other disabilities. And, from yet another
perspective, the claim is trivially true insofar as any
dramatic event or experience integrated into one’s
identity-constituting narrative could then potentially
be described as threatening. From the perspective of
relational personal identity, when DBS dramatically
disrupts the narrative flow, this disruption is best
examined through the lens of agency.
DBS for PD
PD is a chronic progressive brain disorder caused by a
loss of dopamine-producing brain cells. PD leads to
shaking (tremors), rigidity, difficulty with walking,
slowness of movement, and impaired balance and
coordination. In the later stages of illness, there can be
cognitive problems, and in the advanced stages of
illness, dementia is not uncommon.
At the present time, there is no cure for PD. The
goal of treatment is symptom control, mainly
involving the use of levodopa (a drug that converts
in the brain into natural dopamine) and dopamine
agonists. When the prescribed drug therapy is no
longer effective in controlling the tremors and/or
paucity of movement, and the drug induced
dyskinesias are significant, another treatment option
for some Parkinsonian patients is DBS. DBS can be
effective in reducing tremors, slowness of movements,
and gait problems, but there can be serious unwanted
side-effects.
DBS involves implanting electrodes deep into the
brain. The preferred surgical targets for PD are the
subthalamic nucleus (STN) and the globus pallidus
interna (GPi)—two brain areas involved in motor
control. For patients with tremor-dominant PD, the
target may be the thalamus. The electrodes are
connected to a small battery-operated neuro-
stimulator that is surgically implanted under the skin,
usually in the upper part of the chest below the
collarbone. The stimulator, which looks like a cardiac
pacemaker and is sometimes referred to as a brain
pacemaker, is externally programmed to deliver
continuous electrical signals to the targeted brain
area. The stimulation parameters—the amplitude,
the frequency, and the pulse width—are set by the
physician. With some devices, at the discretion of
the programmer, the patient may control the
amplitude (the voltage) within certain parameters
(e.g., 2.4–3.2 V).
The potential benefits of DBS for the treatment of
patients with advanced PD are documented in narrative
form in testimonials available on Medtronics’1 websites
and in case reports. Consider, for example, Richard’s
narrative on Medtronics’ Australian website:
1 Medtronics is a multi-national medical technology company
that manufactures DBS stimulators.
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“When you are an actor, your body is a tool. If
your tool is broken, you can’t work. You can’t
earn a living and you can’t express yourself.”
“My left arm wouldn’t cooperate, so I’d put it in
my pocket, or hold it. Sometimes it would just
dangle there. The comedy I had been enjoying
so much wasn’t so fun anymore.” “I was always
going to another doctor, going to another
specialist, having another test or procedure. It
felt like all I did was live in waiting rooms and
walk down endless corridors without ever getting
anywhere.” Eventually, his [Richard’s] research
led him to deep brain stimulation and he decided
to go ahead. “I’d made up my mind; done all the
tests, had the haircut and passed the audition.”
The day of the operation wasn’t easy… “Then
when they turned the stimulator on the stiffness
disappeared. The effect was immediate.” “Now I
stand up with ease, where once it had been an
almighty struggle. I cross the room like any
normal person going for a stroll” [9].
Similar personal stories can be found on Medtronics’
American website. Below is an excerpt from Chris’
story:
Chris noticed something wrong when he was
out walking with one of his three daughters.
“My arm swing on my right side just quit,” he
recalled. “I started dragging my foot. I had no
idea what was happening.” Within a year of
being diagnosed he lost the use of his right
hand, which meant he couldn’t write. He also
developed slowness and rigidity, cramping, and
involuntary head movements. “My life basically
became just work and sleep.” On his first
morning back at work loading trucks [after the
surgery], Chris felt like a new person. “I could
tell that I wasn’t going through the normal
problems in the morning,” he says. “It usually
would take an hour and a half of cramping and
walking weirdly. That was mostly just gone. I
developed a lot more confidence at work” [10].
Less well documented, but no less relevant, are the
common physical and psychological side-effects of
DBS experienced by patients with PD. For example,
there is the potential problem of weight gain, as well
as the potential for serious disruptive changes in
behaviour, mood and cognition. These changes can
include speech dysfunction (impaired fluency and
vocabulary), reduced working memory and process-
ing speed, acute depression, pathological crying,
mania, fear and alienation. If we return to Richard’s
story (excerpted above), it is not all happiness and
light. Richard experiences depression and slurred
speech:
While the operation was a success, a few weeks
later, Richard went through a period of depres-
sion… “The ordeal of the operation was so
profound that a sense of anticlimax began to
hover over me.” “Back home in the suburbs
you’re a normal bloke, but you feel like you’ve
been to another planet.” Richard is having to
write now rather than act, because he’s suffering
from a side-effect of the operation known as
dysarthria or slurred speech. He finds that his
speech therapy is like going back to acting
classes—think loud and speak slow [9].
A more dramatic case of untoward consequences,
originally reported by Leentjens and colleagues [11],
and subsequently referred to by many others, involves
a 62-year-old male patient with PD who is admitted to
a psychiatric hospital for a manic state resulting from
DBS. As reported by Walter Glannon:
A mood stabiliser failed to control his symp-
toms, which included megalomania and chaotic
behaviour that resulted in serious financial
debts. He became mentally incompetent. Ad-
justment of the stimulator resolved the mania
and restored his cognitive capacity for insight
and rational judgment. Yet this resulted in a
return of his motor symptoms, which were so
severe that the patient became bedridden. This
left the patient and his healthcare providers with
a choice between two mutually exclusive
options: to admit the patient to a nursing home
because of a serious physical disability, despite
intact cognitive and affective capacities; or to
admit the patient to a chronic psychiatric ward
because of a manic state, despite restoration of
good motor function ([1], p. 290).
While competent (that is, off DBS), the patient was
presented with these options. He chose DBS to
improve his motor function, understanding that the
resulting mania would result in his institutionalization
in a chronic psychiatric ward.
Clearly, patients with PD who undergo DBS can
(and do) experience significant benefits. These same
patients, however, also can (and do) experience
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significant unwanted side-effects including cognitive
and psychiatric disturbances (such as major depres-
sion and mania). Whether the effects of DBS are
positive or negative, physical or psychological,
transient or permanent, they can have a profound
impact on personality, on familial, marital, social, and
professional relations, as well as occupational func-
tioning. For those who embrace a static view of
personal identity as comprised of core inclinations
and character traits, changes in these domains
arguably represent a serious threat to personal identity.
For others, who embrace a dynamic view of personal
identity and consider the notion of an authentic self
“given by nature and unchanged by time” outdated
[12], changes in these domains do not represent a
threat to personal identity, but rather are constitutive
of personal identity.
Below, I introduce a philosophical account of
relational personal identity as a dynamic interpersonal
activity based in narrative. On this view, personal
identity is not tied to an individual’s core inclinations
or character traits, but reflects an individual’s lived
experience (and perhaps somemeasure of introspection)
as integrated into her autobiographical narrative.
A Relational Account of Personal Identity
Personal identity is a concept we rely on in attributing
moral responsibility to one person rather than another,
and in ensuring that persons get their just desserts.
Marya Schechtman makes this point succinctly when
she writes of personal identity that it “serves as a
minimum condition in the assessment of responsibil-
ity, obligation, and certain sorts of entitlement. Our
practices of promising, contracting and assessing
praise or blame depend on this notion” ([4], p. 68).
In sharp contrast, our practices of promising, con-
tracting and assessing praise or blame in no way
depend upon personality. For example, if I thought
you were a kind and considerate person when I made
you a promise, I can’t simply disregard my promise to
you because, in my estimation, you are no longer the
kind and considerate person I once thought you were.
Similarly, if I contract with you to pay you an hourly
wage to build me a fence, I can’t simply default on
any payment owed to you because you have become
apathetic since your partner ran off with a younger
man. If you are an imprisoned murderer who has
experienced a religious conversion so that you are
now a pacifist who abhors violence, you are not
thereby absolved of responsibility for your prior
criminal behavior.
In all of these hypothetical situations your person-
ality may have changed, and the change may be
sufficiently radical as to prompt others to say of you
that you are a different person. But in important
respects such statements would be for rhetorical
effect. Generally, it would be understood that,
notwithstanding any change(s) in personality, you
are nonetheless the person to whom a promise, a
wage or a punishment is owed. By the same token,
barring specific terms suggesting otherwise, neither
the promise, the wage nor the punishment is owed to
another in your stead. In brief, a change in personality,
whether gradual or abrupt, subtle or radical, tempo-
rary or permanent, does not in and of itself make for a
change in personal identity.2 The two concepts—
personality and personal identity—are not synony-
mous.
How then are we to define personal identity? A
highly influential answer to this question can be
found in Schechtman’s book The Constitution of
Selves. In this book, Schechtman helpfully draws
our attention to the pivotal identity question—which
she dubs the characterization question—which is
“what actions, experiences, beliefs, values, desires,
character traits and so on (hereafter abbreviated
‘characteristics’) make a person who she is”
([13], p. 73)? In exploring this question, Schechtman
argues that “a person creates his identity by forming
an autobiographical narrative—a story of his life”
([13], p. 93). According to Schechtman:
[I]ndividuals constitute themselves as persons
by coming to think of themselves as persisting
subjects who have had experience in the past
and will continue to have experience in the
future, taking certain experiences as theirs… A
person’s identity… is constituted by the content
of her self-narrative, and the traits, actions, and
experiences included in it are, by virtue of that
inclusion, hers ([13], p. 94).
2 A possible exception is dissociative identity disorder where
two or more personalities appear to control an individual’s
behavior (as evidenced by radical psychological discontinu-
ities). Schechtman suggests that perhaps the different person-
alities “represent distinct persons inhabiting a single human
body” ([4], 67).
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Not all personal narratives are identity-constituting,
however. Some such narratives are at most personal
myths. According to Schechtman, for a self-narrative
to be identity-constituting, it must satisfy two
constraints—the articulation constraint and the reality
constraint. An identity-constituting self-narrative must
be capable of local articulation (that is, the person must
be able to provide some account of her history, her life
situation, and her motivations). As Schechtman insists,
“the narrator should be able to explain why he does what
he does, believes what he believes, and feels what
he feels” ([13], p. 114). A person need not be able to
narrate her whole life in a self-conscious way, but
she must be able to narrate parts of it ([13], p.105).
That is, she must be able to render her self-narrative
intelligible. As regards the reality constraint,
Schechtman insists that the self-narrative must
cohere with basic observational facts about the
world. That is, an identity-constituting self-
narrative must cohere with reality: “This is not to
say that a narrative must be totally accurate in every
regard or contain no trivial mistakes, but it should
exhibit a fundamental grasp of what the world is
like” ([13], p. 83).
From another perspective, Laurence Thomas
argues that identity is an interpersonal social construct.
He writes:
[W]e are constituted through others, … the way
in which we conceive of ourselves, at least in
part, owes, much to how others conceive [of] us,
and this is necessarily so. The way in which we
think of ourselves is inextricably tied to the way
in which others think of us ([14], p. 365).
This view is consonant with the views of those who
espouse a feminist relational understanding of auton-
omy. As Susan Sherwin reminds us:
[N]o one is fully independent … the view of
individuals as isolated social units is not only
false but impoverished: much of who we are
and what we value is rooted in our relationships
and affinities with others … all persons are, to a
significant degree, socially constructed ([15],
pp. 34–35).
Finally, it is also important to recognize the ways in
which the body can and does influence who we are
and how we can be in the world. Race, class, gender,
ethnicity, age, sexual orientation, and ability are
features of the self that others read off the body in
the context of “complex networks of social norms,
institutions, practices, conventions, expectations, and
attitudes” ([16], p. 15). So it is that “agents’ identities
are formed within the context of social relationships
and shaped by a complex of intersecting social
determinants, such as race, class, gender and ethnic-
ity” ([17], p. 4). Reasoning along similar lines, Linda
Martín Alcoff writes more specifically about how race
and gender affect “our relations in the world, which in
turn affects our interior life, that is, our lived
experience or subjectivity” ([18], p. 92).
Taken together, these discrete perspectives on
identity inform my philosophical account of relational
identity as “a dynamic, socially, culturally, politically,
and historically situated communicative activity
(based in narrative and performance) that is informed
by the interests, perspectives, and creative intentions
of close and distant others” ([7], p. 110). This account
of relational identity takes seriously the claim that “a
person creates his identity by forming an autobio-
graphical narrative—a story of his life” ([13], p. 93).
It also embraces the claim that we are constituted/
constructed in and through personal (intimate) rela-
tionships and public (impersonal social and political)
interactions. Finally, it accepts the claim that we are
embodied selves situated in particular social, cultural,
political and historical contexts. In this way, relational
personal identity recognizes that the desires, beliefs,
values, emotions, intentions, memories, actions and
experiences that make up a person’s self-narrative are
shaped in and through relationships.
This relational account of personal identity is
distinct from both the somatic (or biological) account
of personal identity, as well as the psychological
account of personal identity. My identity is not in my
body or in my brain, but in the negotiated spaces
between my body and brain, and the bodies and
brains of others:
[I]dentities are created by relational beings
mutually engaged in the never-ending project
of constituting themselves in and through
personal relationships and public interactions
in order to answer such personal questions as:
Who am I? Where am I from? Where have I
been? Where am I going? What do I care about?
What do I stand for? Who do I want to be? Who
am I becoming? Indeed, it is through our (more
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or less conscious) interpretations of our values,
memories, actions, experiences, and so on as
well as the (more or less conscious) interpreta-
tions of these same characteristics by others that
we come to embody answers to these pivotal
questions, thereby instantiating our place in the
world as we continually strive for balance
between how we see and understand ourselves
and how others see and understand us ([7],
p.117).
Relational identity is a dialectical process aimed at
achieving equilibrium—some kind of temporary and
temporizing balance between self-ascription and
ascription by others (i.e., others who are a part of
one’s familial, social, cultural, and political clusters of
meaning and belonging) [7]. This view is consonant
with the work of Lorraine Code who suggests that
“uniqueness, creativity, and moral accountability grow
out of interdependence and continually turn back to it
for affirmation and continuation” ([19], p. 82). With
a relational account of personal identity, the identity-
constituting narrative is the narrative that effectively
balances how a person sees and understands herself,
with how others see and understand her. That is, the
identity-constituting narrative is the narrative that
satisfies the “equilibrium constraint”.
The equilibrium constraint requires minimal endorse-
ment or uptake by others of one’s projected self-
narrative. When there is no uptake, the cyclical and
iterative process of identity formation that involves
combining and resolving projected and perceived self-
narratives into a coherent, identity-constituting narrative
begins (again).
To be clear, equilibrium is different from stability,
insofar as the latter is presumed to be more enduring.
Equilibrium, on the other hand, is a temporary state of
affairs during which time the projected self-narratives
and perceived self-narratives are in balance. At such
time, the self is able to take notice of her place in the
world and choose to embrace, refine or revise her
projected self-narrative as part of the ongoing, never-
ending process of identity formation.
A projected self-narrative can be a preferred self-
narrative or performed self-narrative and most likely
is some combination of both. The preferred self-
narrative is the story of who the person wants to be. If
we think back to the cases described at the outset,
Richard’s preferred self-narrative might be that of the
brilliant actor struck down in his prime by illness. If
others perceive Richard in this way then they will
endorse his story, and for a time this will be his
identity-constituting narrative. If this is not how
others perceive Richard, however, then the equilibri-
um constraint will not be satisfied. Others, for
example, might consider Richard an average actor,
but an excellent writer who might never have
discovered his talent for writing, but for his illness.
In tandem with the preferred self-narrative is the
performed self-narrative. The performed self-narrative
is the story of who the person can be, given the ways
in which his life is constrained by self and others.
Richard’s performed self-narrative may be that of the
self-assured curmudgeon who writes for a living,
because that is what brilliant actors do when they
retire. But maybe Richard fears his illness and
chooses to mask his fear with cocky, surly behaviour.
Who is Richard? If we look for an intelligible self-
narrative articulated by Richard and facts that cohere
with reality, as Schechtman would have us do,
Richard is a man who once worked as an actor, and
whose acting career has come to an end because of
PD. Can we say more? For example, can we say that
Richard was a brilliant actor; is an acerbic character?
On a relational account of personal identity,
Richard is the person at the intersection of who he
wants to be, and who others will minimally let him
be. From a more technical standpoint, Richard’s
identity-constituting narrative is the self-narrative that
satisfies the equilibrium constraint. That is, Richard’s
identity-constituting narrative is the narrative that
he is able to construct and maintain through complex
(conscious or unconscious) intimate and public inter-
actions involving “self”-perception, “self”-projection,
“other”-perception, and “other”-reaction.
For Richard, the fact that he worked as an actor,
may be sufficient minimal uptake of his self-narrative
to satisfy the equilibrium constraint. Then again,
Richard may need further endorsement of additional
features of his self-narrative to effectively balance
how he sees and understands himself with how others
see and understand him. This endorsement may come
in the form of laudatory reviews praising Richard’s
performances. If there are no such external endorse-
ments, however, and instead Richard is faced with an
alternative narrative of ‘average actor’, a number of
strategies are available to Richard in an effort to
establish equilibrium. For example, Richard could
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modify his “self”-perception and “self”-projection to
better accommodate the perceptions and reactions of
others in his community of belonging. For example,
Richard may come to see and understand himself as
others see and understand him—a talented writer who
has found his calling. As a result, Richard may
(consciously or unconsciously) come to have less care
about his previous career as an actor and may have
less vested in the persona of ‘brilliant actor’. As a
result of this change in perception, Richard may
change his projected self-narrative and in so doing
garner sufficient uptake of his revised narrative for
there to be equilibrium. On the other hand, if neither
the original self-narrative nor any revised self-
narrative garners minimal support/endorsement, then
another option for restoring equilibrium would be for
Richard to change his community of belonging. Then
again, Richard could attempt to achieve equilibrium
by simply dismissing any discordance between his
projected narrative and the narrative perceived by
others, as their error.
With the equilibrium constraint, what matters for
Richard’s identity-constituting narrative is not what
others objectively believe to be true (as these others
could be “mistaken, bigoted or hostile” ([20], p. 92)),
nor what Richard asserts to be true (as he may be
“ignorant, mistaken, self-deceived, or mendacious”
with respect to his self-narrative ([7], p. 116)), but
what balance can be achieved between who Richard
says he is, and who others will minimally let him be.
On a relational account of personal identity, Richard’s
identity-constituting narrative is what emerges in the
negotiated space between Richard and others.
Richard’s identity is a balance between self-ascription
and ascription by others (“self”-perception, “self”-
projection, “other”-perception, and “other”-reaction) as
he (consciously or unconsciously) engages in the never-
ending dialectical project of tailoring his identity (or
shifting his community of belonging) in response to
events, experiences and perceptions.
Helmut Dubiel
I met Helmut Dubiel, philosopher, university profes-
sor, and author of Deep in the brain: Living with
Parkinson’s disease [8] in April 2009. We were both
invited speakers at a conference in Freiburg, Germany
entitled Pimp Your Brain! [21] I spoke in English
about the ethical and social implications of neuro-
enhancement. Dubiel spoke in German about his
illness experience with PD and with DBS. I don’t
understand or speak German and so after his talk we
met for coffee. Dubiel is fluent in English.
Dubiel was diagnosed with early onset PD at the
age of 46. When I met him he had been living with
PD for close to 16 years and had been fitted with his
brain pacemaker for about three years. As a side-
effect of DBS, Dubiel’s speech was impaired. In order
to enunciate clearly, he needed to turn off the
pacemaker or set the amplitude very low. When the
amplitude was high, his voice was low and his
articulation was slurred. In his words, his speech
was soft and “washed out” ([8], p. 116).
In conversation with Dubiel, I learned about
some of the early problems he experienced while
teaching. There were difficulties writing on the
chalk board, speaking clearly and commanding the
respect of students. As I listened to Dubiel, I
reflected on how important it is for those of us who
lecture in front of small and large classes to have
control of our mobility and our speech. Dubiel also
alluded to his academic successes and how he had
imagined (hoped) his writings would be remem-
bered as important contributions to the literature.
While he was pleased with the critical acclaim for
his autobiography, he also bemoaned the fact that
he likely would be remembered more for this work
than his academic writing.
When I asked Dubiel more pointed questions about
identity, he spoke about the importance of erotic
touching and how with PD it had become more
difficult for him to see himself, and for others to see
him, in the role of lover. Of the early days following
diagnosis, Dubiel reports that “[e]rotic touching and
encounters grew all the more important the thicker the
glass wall became between me and my social
environment” ([8], p. 39).
Near the end of our conversation, Dubiel needed to
neuro-stimulate himself. This prompted me to ask him
if he was self-conscious doing this in a public place,
and whether it would be better if the neuro-stimulator
could be placed under the skin near the wrist instead
of in the upper part of the chest and if it could be
activated by applying gentle pressure. I suggested this
might allow for more discrete neuro-stimulation. On
this point Dubiel was adamant—“No, then I would
feel like a machine”.
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At the end of our conversation, Dubiel told me
that his autobiography would soon be available in
English. In reading this book, I learned more about
Dubiel the professor, the lover, the father, the son
and the friend. In each of these roles, Dubiel’s life
had transitioned in challenging ways. Of particular
note were the ways in which the diagnosis of PD
and the treatments available to him (including
DBS) shaped his sense of self in and through his
relationships with others.
Early in his autobiography, Dubiel reports on his
diagnosis of PD:
The first and simultaneously most lasting
feeling that the diagnosis of Parkinson’s trig-
gered was a sense of narcissistic injury, one that
no other injury inflicted by a human being has
ever surpassed. At a single blow, I felt excluded
from the fellowship of those who simply had
their bodies at their disposal, who experienced
no friction losses between an impulse to act and
the action itself ([8], pp. 38–39).
This is a clear statement in explicitly relational
terms about how PD had a profound impact on
Dubiel’s personal identity in excluding him from the
fellowship of able-bodied individuals. As noted
above, persons are embodied selves. So it is that
Dubiel’s body is a constitutive element of his self; it
influences who he is and how he can be in the world.
How he sees and understands himself, and how others
see and understand him is mediated through his body
and, more particularly, his limited ability to control his
body. This limited ability is a recurring theme in
Dubiel’s autobiography.
Dubiel dislikes photos of himself. They do not allow
him to see himself as he would like to be: “virile and in
full control of my life, a man who lifts his eyes to the
stars but has both feet on the ground” ([8], p. 38). In the
few photos of Dubiel taken during his first years with
PD, Dubiel notices “a mask-like rigidity, while in
contrast I find my eyes to be larger, sadder, and more
expressive than before I fell ill” ([8], p. 39).
At the time of diagnosis, Dubiel is, from his
perspective, at the top of his game:
I had just been appointed a full professor, while
retaining my position as deputy director of a
small but prestigious research institute. At the
time, my ambition and energy level were ample
for two jobs. I was successful. I was publishing
books and monographs on a regular basis, and
they found readers… I was the crown prince of
the institute ([8], p. 50).
Once I received the diagnosis, however, a gradual
process of alienation arose between the institute
and me, which would conclude three years later
with a humiliating dismissal ([8], p. 50).
Here the theme of alienation is even more explicit
and continues to be so for Dubiel as his illness
progresses. In the year following his diagnosis, he
reports:
I changed radically. It was surely not a transfor-
mation caused by verifiable changes in brain
physiology, but rather a psychological adjust-
ment to a biorhythm that had becomes utterly
unpredictable due to the illness and medication
([8], p.50) … I became estranged from many
colleagues and friends whom I had known for
ages [8], (p. 52).
In further contemplating his illness, Dubiel writes:
[W]hen it [Parkinson’s] is full-blown, [it] robs a
person of the ability to continually reinvent
himself. It forces him into a cramped cycle of
ever-identical activities … One’s life becomes
similar to that of a plant: silent, without
transcendence and autonomy. In a sense, it’s
not even a life anymore—just existence in an
atrophied form ([8], p. 60).
At the time of writing Dubiel does not have full-
blown PD. Atrophied existence is what he anticipates,
not what he experiences. Dubiel’s experience is one of
fragmentation—of living at least two lives—a private
life in which he partially acknowledges his illness to
himself and a close circle of friends, and a public life in
which the illness is a well-guarded secret.
Eventually, the drug therapy is no longer effective
in counteracting the symptoms of Dubiel’s disease
and the dyskenesias caused by over-medication have
become “torturous”. At this time, Dubiel opts for
DBS in the hope of improving his motor functions.
Post-surgery he reports that from a medical perspective
all went well:
According to the surgeons’ criteria, the opera-
tion was a full success. My tremor disappeared,
as well as the dyskenesias which had tormented
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me… My movements were fluid and relaxed.
My medication intake could be drastically
reduced ([8], p. 84).
Dubiel acknowledges these facts. He admits that
the “tremor, the torturous dyskenesias, and the ‘off’
conditions were simply gone. [The] medication intake
had dropped by twenty-five percent, [and] overall
mobility and endurance were markedly better than
before” ([8], p. 94). Nonetheless, similar to the
experience of other patients with PD who have
undergone DBS, Dubiel is “dissatisfied with the
overall outcome of the procedure” ([8], p. 93):
… in my case the operation had merely replaced
the plague with cholera. I simply had the
impression that during the entire first year the
upshot of this major and extremely expensive
surgery had been to replace one set of grave
symptoms with another ([8], p. 93).
Dubiel experiences profound depression and a
range of physical problems including a speech
disturbance, shortness of breath when bending,
inability to write, small-stepped gait and a tendency
to fall on stairs and no sense of smell and taste.
Dubiel identifies his speech problem as the worst of
these side-effects:
My worst post-operative symptom, which
remains unchanged to this day, is a speech
disturbance: my volume is too low, and my
articulation is poor, slurred. Often I can’t even
command twenty percent of my normal speech
volume ([8], p. 94).
While Dubiel describes his worst side-effect as
reduced speech volume, in relational terms, his worst
side-effect is a profound sense of alienation. For
Dubiel, the volume of this voice (and more particu-
larly the risk of “making unintelligible, poorly
articulated comments in a feeble voice” ([8], p. 123))
mark him in public and set him apart from his
peers. Another source of stigmatization is his
movement patterns: “Now I walk through the
street and count the oncoming pedestrians who
look at my asymmetrical shuffling gait with
curiosity or alienation” ([8], p. 109). These physical
limitations negatively affect Dubiel’s relationships
with close and distant others.
In time, Dubiel learns to deal with the unwanted
side-effects by adjusting the pacemaker amplitudes. If
he wants to enunciate clearly, he sets the amplitude
very low knowing this will lead “to relative immo-
bility and depression” ([8], p. 120). In the alternative,
if he wants to walk any distance, he sets the amplitude
much higher knowing that his speech will become
inaudible. While having to choose between talking
and walking is less than ideal, Dubiel’s restored
ability (within limited parameters) to control his body
in social situations restores his pride and professional
authority. In turn, this allows him to conceive of a
continued place for himself within the academy.
Meanwhile, he dreams about the things he would like
to be able to do including, “walk through large
crowds of people without fear, dance, talk with
strangers in noisy train stations, stroll along the path
that leads from Harlem down to Battery Park on a
sunny September day in New York” ([8], p. 128).
So, who is Helmut Dubiel? Dubiel is the person at
the intersection of who he wants to be, and who
others will minimally let him be. His identity-
constituting narrative is the self-narrative that
satisfies the equilibrium constraint. It is the
narrative that he is able to construct and maintain
through complex (conscious or unconscious) inti-
mate and public interactions involving “self”-
perception, “self”-projection, “other”-perception,
and “other”-reaction. From Dubiel’s autobiographical
narrative we know that at least during one period of
equilibrium following DBS, he was a person alienated
from colleagues and loved ones.
DBS for PD and Threats to Personal Identity
Is DBS for PD a threat to personal identity? This
question can be answered in the affirmative or the
negative depending upon the theory of personal
identity that informs the answer. For example,
applying the narrative self-constitution view of iden-
tity, Schechtman concludes that DBS for PD can be a
threat to personal identity [4]. Schechtman elucidates
this viewpoint in her discussion of a hypothetical
case involving a Mr. Garrison, a 61-year-old
American with PD who consents to DBS to treat
his tremors and severe apathy. Following surgery,
Mr. Garrison experiences significant improvement
in his motor symptoms and dramatic changes in
personality. Where once he was shy and intro-
verted, he is now outgoing and gregarious. Where
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once he was a loyal Republican, he is now a Democrat.
Where once he was enthusiastic about his work, he has
now quit his job to promote various social, political and
charitable causes.
Schechtman believes that “since narrative is a
dynamic notion, continuity of narrative is thoroughly
compatible with even quite radical change” ([22],
p. 140). Nonetheless, she concludes that DBS can be
a threat to personal identity. In her discussion of Mr.
Garrison’s personal identity Schechtman is particu-
larly concerned with the mechanism of personality
change—electrodes implanted in the brain, not
“natural personal development” ([4], p. 85). The
‘fact’ that Mr. Garrison’s values, motivations and
actions are the result of DBS is, according to
Schechtman, at odds with the articulation constraint
on identity-constituting narratives according to
which “the narrator should be able to explain why
he does what he does, believes what he believes, and
feels what he feels” ([13], p. 114). Mr. Garrison can’t
explain how his actions flow from his “plans,
projects, intentions, beliefs, and desires” because
they don’t; “his current passions and interests—the
things he takes as reasons—were caused by manip-
ulation of his brain” ([4], p. 85). From this
perspective, Mr. Garrison’s personal identity is
threatened insofar as he runs afoul of the articulation
constraint. From another perspective, Schechtman
insists that if Mr. Garrison were to suggest that his
newfound passions and interests were the result of
personal development and not DBS, then he would
run afoul of the reality constraint, according to
which the self-narrative must cohere with basic
observational facts about the world.
Schechtman’s affirmative answer to the question
“Is DBS a threat to personal identity?” is intuitively
appealing. “But for” the DBS, Mr. Garrison would
still be the shy Republican with a Puritan work ethic.
To appreciate the limitations of this affirmative
response, however, we need only reflect briefly on
the use of DBS to treat psychological problems
instead of motor symptoms. Consider, for example,
the use of DBS for the treatment of severe, treatment-
refractory depression or obsessive compulsive disor-
der. Imagine that following DBS the depressed patient
is happy or the patient with obsessive compulsive
disorder doesn’t experience the same impulses. Would
we find the conclusion that DBS is threatening to
personal identity as intuitively appealing in these
instances? Or, would we be more inclined to endorse
the view that “even quite radical change” can be
successfully integrated into a patient’s autobiograph-
ical narrative (i.e., her life story)? Further, if we
return to Schechtman’s original description of
the articulation constraint on identity-constituting
narratives—that the person be able to provide some
account of her history, her life situation, and her
motivations; that she be able to narrate parts of her
life in a self-conscious way; that she be able to
render her self-narrative intelligible—it is unclear
why a patient could not satisfy the articulation
constraint by including a description of consent to
DBS in her self-narrative.
In my view, Schechtman’s intuitively appealing
affirmative answer to the question “Is DBS for PD a
threat to personal identity?” is unsatisfactory. Below,
applying a relational account of personal identity, I
offer alternative responses to the question “Is DBS for
PD a threat to personal identity?”
A first plausible response to this question affirms
that DBS for PD is not (and never could be) a threat
to personal identity because personal identity is a
dynamic concept:
[t]here is no true self, only a dynamic socially,
culturally, and politically constituted self that is
historically situated and that at any one point in
time can be more or less stable. Indeed, it is
only in interaction with others and through their
instantiation of, or resistance to, a storied and
projected self that a person can experience either
affirmation or disruption, both of which are
relevant to the project of stabilizing one’s self-
narrative in an effort to achieve a period of
equilibrium ([7], p. 123).
A patient with PD who undergoes DBS may
experience “a unique form of biographical disruption”
([23], p. 1850). It does not follow, however, that the
patient’s personal identity is under threat. If the self is
a dynamic, socially, culturally and politically consti-
tuted self that is shaped over time through experience
(and perhaps introspection), it makes no sense to
describe any particular event or experience (including
DBS) as threatening. There is no pre-set autobio-
graphical narrative (i.e., life story) that has been
thwarted by some unfortunate event or experience.
There just is the life story as it unfolds. On this view,
what matters is whether (and, if so, to what extent) an
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event or experience is integrated (consciously or
unconsciously) into an identity-constituting narrative.
This brings us to a second plausible response to the
question “Is DBS for PD a threat to personal
identity?” This response involves looking at the
question from a moral perspective, and seeing that
an identity-constituting narrative can be damaging
when it is the result of oppression, as “when an
individual in certain contexts and circumstances is
forced to live for periods of time within the confines
of another’s ideas about what makes for an appropri-
ate self-narrative” ([7], p. 124). As I have argued
elsewhere:
an identity-constituting narrative is not, in and
of itself, a good thing—much depends on the
extent to which the identity is asserted or
assigned … When a person is able to fashion
and project an identity-constituting narrative
that she values (hopefully a self-narrative that
fosters her talents and dreams) and is able to
motivate appropriate uptake of the self-
narrative she embraces, there may be evidence
of autonomy … On the other hand, when a
person is unable to contribute effectively to a
satisfying self-narrative and finds herself
forced to live within constraints set by others
who have fixed ideas about who she is and
who she can be, there may be evidence of
oppression ([7], pp. 123–124).
When considered from a moral perspective, a
person must be able to contribute actively to the
authoring of her life in a manner that is consistent
with her broader interests, values and commitments.
When this is not the case, as when others have “a
disproportionate hand in writing stories for [others]…
that are limiting, cruel, oppressive or alienating”
([24], p. 127), a serious moral problem arises because
of the ways in which agency and autonomy are
constrained. Consider, for example, the scope of
possible identity-constituting narratives available to
persons with PD (with or without DBS) in a society
that is not welcoming of persons with physical and
psychological disabilities. In such a society, a person’s
experiences will be significantly affected by stories
others have constructed to restrict the range of
narratives that can be appropriated and successfully
enacted. In such a society, discriminatory attitudes
towards persons with disabilities, not DBS for PD,
would be a serious potential threat to personal
identity. To be clear on this point, the threat to
personal identity experienced by persons with dis-
abilities is analogous to the threat experienced by
women in a patriarchal society, by coloured people in
a racist white society, and by gay people in a
homophobic society. The threat, such as it is, are the
beliefs and attitudes of others that result in stigmati-
zation and alienation, which in turn may result in
negative experiences and feelings being integrated
into one’s identity-constituting narrative.
A third response to the question “Is DBS for PD
a threat to personal identity?” is similar in
orientation to that offered by Schechtman. On a
relational account of personal identity, “but for” the
DBS the identity-constituting narrative would be
quite different (perhaps even radically different).
On this view, DBS for PD distorts the dialectical
process of identity formation and, for this reason, is
a threat to personal identity. DBS for PD limits
how a person sees and understands herself; as such
DBS limits what the protagonist of an autobio-
graphical narrative can project for minimal en-
dorsement by others. A person with PD who has
been treated with DBS cannot successfully project
a self-narrative that is impervious to the fact of
DBS. This constraint on what can be projected,
acts as a constraint on what can be perceived. In
turn, the interplay between constrained projected
and perceived self-narratives gives rise to a differ-
ent identity-constituting narrative.
A problem with this perspective on DBS for PD as
a threat to personal identity, however, is that it renders
any and all life events and experiences (whether
initially considered positive or negative) potential
threats to identity. If DBS for PD is a threat to
personal identity because it constrains how a person
sees and understands herself, which in turn constrains
the dialectical process of identity formation, then so
too PD is a threat to personal identity, and so too is
potentially every other life event or experience
integrated into an identity-constituting narrative in-
cluding graduation, promotion, job loss, marriage,
birth of a child, tsunami, divorce, death of a loved
one, earthquake and so on. As we live our lives (that
is, as our story unfolds), we experience countless
events that irrevocably constrain what narrative(s) we
can project. For example, marriage following a brief
passionate love affair does away with the identity of
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bachelor/bachelorette. Is this event/experience to be
understood as a threat to personal identity? Does the
answer to this question change if the partner turns out
to be physically or psychologically abusive, or
unfaithful, or obsequious? “But for” the marriage,
the spouse might have more self-confidence, more
independence, more friends, better health, and so on.
Consider another example—onset of a severe neuro-
degenerative disease such as PD. For some this will
be a devastating occurrence, for others this may prove
to be ‘the making of the man’. In either case the
narrative flow will be disrupted.
Michael J. Fox was a prominent Canadian actor in
the 1980s and 90s, well-known for his roles in the
television series “Family Ties,” and “Spin City” and in
the “Back to the Future” movie franchise. In 1991, he
was diagnosed with early onset PD. In 2000, a few years
after having publicly announced his illness, he launched
the Michael J. Fox Foundation for Parkinson’s research.
At this time, he also turned his attention to writing and
has authored several bestsellers—Lucky Man (2002),
Always Looking Up: The Adventures of an Incurable
Optimist (2009), and A Funny Thing Happened on the
Way to the Future, (2010). Michael J. Fox’s identity-
constituting narrative is complex and many of the
narrative details are subject to multiple interpretations.
At minimum, he is an accomplished actor, a published
author, a person living with PD and an effective
advocate for others living with PD.
To be sure, Michael J. Fox’s life trajectory would
have been very different “but for” his illness. It also
would have been very different, however, “but for”
his successful career as an actor. Moreover, without
this prior successful career, he might not have become
a successful advocate for people living with PD. And,
without both of these life experiences he might not
have been awarded the Order of Canada in 2011 for
“a lifetime of outstanding achievement, dedication to
the community and service to the nation.” All of these
events and experiences are part of his identity-
constituting narrative; none of these events, each of
which might be described as a biographical disruption,
can properly be described as a threat to his identity.
To insist on this point, PD is to Michael J. Fox as
spinal cord injury was to Christopher Reeve. The
actor, famous for his role in the movie Superman (and
sequels), was paralyzed as a result of an equestrian
accident. Along with his wife Dana, he founded the
Christopher and Dana Reeve Foundation to support
spinal cord injury research and to improve the quality
of life of persons living with spinal cord injury.
Christopher Reeves’ identity is that of the actor-
turned-advocate for spinal cord injury research. His
accident was no more a threat to his personal identity
(his autobiographical narrative) than his career as an
actor. Both of these facets of his life were an integral
part of his personal identity—his life story.
To recap, a major life event or experience that
dramatically disrupts the narrative flow undeniably
constrains the dialectical process of identity formation
(and thereby alters a planned or anticipated narrative),
but this biographical disruption does not, in itself,
constitute a threat to identity.
A fourth plausible response to the question “Is
DBS for PD a threat to personal identity?” suggests
that DBS is such a threat but only insofar as it is a
threat to agency—the ability to make informed and
rational choices—as when a person’s actions do not
flow from her intentions or beliefs but rather are the
result of direct brain manipulation. Here it is worth
noting that following DBS patients not only report “I
don’t feel like myself anymore,” and “I haven’t found
myself again after the operation,” they also report “I
feel like a robot,” and “I feel like an electric doll” ([6],
p. 1813). Emerging research on the effects of DBS on
patients with PD suggests that there is cause for concern
with respect to the ways in which direct brain
stimulation potentially affects agency. For example,
pathological gambling is now recognized as a potential
side-effect of DBS [25–27]. This means that some
patients with PD who have been treated with DBS and
who spend excessive amounts of time in front of slot
machines do not do so as a matter of choice, but as a
consequence of brain manipulation. When direct brain
manipulation explains a belief or behavior there is reason
to think of this as a serious threat to agency, which in
some instances may give rise to a threat to identity.
Conclusion
For illustrative purposes, this article has focused
narrowly on DBS for PD. The conclusions that
follow, however, apply to DBS in general.
DBS can be a uniquely disruptive experience
resulting in dramatic changes in behaviour, mood
and cognition. Such changes can have a major impact
on personality and, according to some, can also have
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a major impact on personal identity. If personal identity
is understood in static terms, it may be reasonable to
worry about how changes in personality potentially
threaten personal identity. But, if personal identity is
understood in dynamic, narrative and relational terms
(and if personality and personal identity are understood
not to be synonymous), then the claim that DBS is a
threat to personal identity is problematic. From one
perspective, the claim is false because it misunderstands
the dynamic nature of personal identity. From a second
perspective, the claim is misdirected because it is not
DBS for PD but rather the discriminatory attitudes of
others towards persons with disability that are threaten-
ing to personal identity. From yet another perspective,
the claim is trivially true as all dramatic events and
experiences integrated into an autobiographical narra-
tive, not only DBS for PD, are then potentially
threatening to personal identity.
There is one sense, however, in which it may be
accurate and not trivially true to describe DBS as a
threat to personal identity. This is when DBS under-
mines agency to such an extent that the person is no
longer able to meaningfully contribute to the author-
ing of her own life (i.e., to contribute to the cyclical
and iterative process of projecting, defending and
revising a self-narrative). Without the ability to
contribute to the process of identity formation, a
person loses the ability to hold on to a sense of self.
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